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The purpose of this study is two fold.  First, to estimate the impact of institutional and 
non-institutional arrangements on bilateral trade, and second to analyse the impact of SAFTA 
on bilateral trade in the short as well as in the long run. The empirical analysis which is based 
on the panel of eight South Asian countries, comprising data over the period i.e. 1975–2013 is 
conducted using fixed effects model along with Pooled Mean-Group (PMG) estimator for 
estimating the short and long-run relationships. The analysis has shown that trade agreements 
including South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) are 
not effective in promoting trade, due to low institutional quality and stringent non-institutional 
arrangements, including high tariff along with low physical infrastructure. Further empirical 
analysis has shown that both SAFTA and MFN can only contribute to bilateral trade 
significantly, if complemented by institutional framework. As a policy lesson, to improve the 
trade ties between India and Pakistan, improvement in physical as well as soft infrastructure is 
required. Any trade agreements between the two,  including MFN can only be effective, when 
it is supported by a well-defined and enforced institutional framework that ensure the 
implementation of policy reforms needed to reduce tariff rate and remove non-tariff barriers.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India, the two largest economies in South 
Asia, has always remained low and has faced a series of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The 
volume of bilateral trade ranges between 2 to 3 percent of each country’s total trade, and 
is concentrated in a few commodities. Neither Pakistan nor India  is generally considered 
as an open economy.  Both countries have among the most restrictive trade regimes in the 
world. The Trade Tariff Restrictiveness Index (TTRI) shows that the average tariff rates 
are higher in Pakistan and India in comparison to  other regions [Looi Kee, Nicita, and 
Olarreaga (2012)]. There has also been no significant improvement in either country’s 
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logistics performance index over the last eight years [Arvis, et al. (2014)]. Bilateral trade 
is constrained by soft and physical poor infrastructure. 
Over the last two decades, both countries have made various moves towards 
improving economic relations with a vision to enhance peace and stability in the region 
[De, Raihan, and Ghani (2013)]. In 1995, India granted the MFN status to Pakistan, but 
the latter did not reciprocate. Moreover in 2011, Pakistan decided to extend the MFN 
status to India, with an aim to be effective from January 1, 2013. In response, India 
brought down its SAFTA’s ―sensitive list‖ to 100 tariff lines at six-digit level by April 
2013. By December 2012, this target was missed and Pakistan failed to grant the MFN 
status to India. The process has been delayed due to concerns expressed by different trade 
lobbies, and also an incident across the Line of Control (LoC) further hampered the 
process. The SAFTA has likewise failed to live up to the expectations. In 2004, the two 
countries signed the agreement, along with six other South Asian nations, but there has 
been no substantial improvement in the trading environment and no increase occurred in 
bilateral trade either.  
On the other hand, literature has shown that there is a huge potential to expand 
bilateral trade between India and Pakistan [Husain (2013); Nabi and Nasim (2001); Pasha 
and Imran (2012)]. It is evident that Pakistan and India’s economies are highly 
complementary, and are becoming more so over time. The two countries also share a 
common border, history and cultural similarities. Khan (2009) stated that trade between 
Pakistan and India is unnaturally small, but the scope for gains from increased trade is 
correspondingly large. He also argued that ―improving economic ties may help to resolve 
the larger political issues that have bedevilled India-Pakistan overall relations‖. Yet 
despite all this, trade ties between the two largest economies in South Asia remain weak.  
It is to be argued as to what are the underlying factors that are restricting trade 
between the two countries? And why have attempts to increase trade, including SAFTA, 
been ineffective? In this paper, it is also argued that institutional and non-institutional 
arrangements are crucial in explaining the ineffectiveness of trade reforms, including 
SAFTA, in boosting bilateral trade. Institutional arrangements such as documentation 
process and governance structure are poorly defined that create rent-seeking opportunities 
which hamper trade between the two countries. It is also noted that the procedural 
requirements are very high in both Pakistan and India as compared to other regions. For 
example, nine documents are required to complete the export process and eight for 
imports in Pakistan. While, only four documents are required for import or exports in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) regions. Similar situation 
exists for India. On the other hand, 22 days are required to complete the export process in 
Pakistan, while the same  is completed in 10 days in  the EU and OECD countries [WB 
(2015)]. The quality of institutions is also very poor in these countries as compared to 
others regions of the world. Non-institutional factors such as trade facilitation measures 
and physical infrastructure act as binding constraints in promoting trade. Trade 
facilitation measures are very stringent and poorly managed in both countries than other 
regions in the world. Pakistan and India have been placed in the group of partial 
performer countries, which include countries with logistics constraints—most often seen 
in low and middle income countries. According to the World Bank, Pakistan is ranked 72 
among 166 countries in the Logistic Performance Index (LPI) 2014, which evaluates 
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logistics performance on the six dimensions of logistic performance. Pakistan’s rank is 
much below than Malaysia (25), China (28), Thailand (35) and Indonesia (53). Germany 
holds top position in the logistic performance [Arvis, et al. (2014)]. It is also argued that 
trade reform policies, especially SAFTA and MFN may not be effective in the short run 
as it is a long term phenomenon that requires extensive reforms.  
The overall objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of institutional and 
non-institutional arrangements on bilateral trade. For this purpose, the study incorporates 
the role of democratic institutions and non-tariff barriers in standard gravity model and 
investigates the impact of SAFTA on bilateral trade in the short as well as in the long run. 
The study contributes to literature on two counts: first, it extends the standard gravity 
model by incorporating the role of democratic institutions and non-tariff barriers in 
explaining bilateral trade; and second it estimates the impact of SAFTA in the short and 
long run. The analysis provides policy framework for improving trade ties between 
Pakistan and India to reap the potential trade benefits.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: literature review is presented in 
Section 2; Section 3 discusses the stylised facts regarding bilateral trade; Section 4 
elaborates the data and methodology; empirical results and discussion are presented in 
Section 5 and the last section concludes the discussion with policy recommendations. 
 
2.  BILATERAL TRADE: STYLISED FACTS 
This section depicts some stylised facts regarding Pakistan’s trade with India in 
contrast with other regions and countries. Trade remains very low in the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region even after signing the SAFTA in 
2004. The SAARC region remains one of the least integrated regions in the world. The 
overall trade share remains between 3 to 5 percent of the total trade. The largest trade share 
observed with the Middle Eastern countries (30.5 percent of total trade) followed by Europe 
(18 percent of total trade) and NAFTA (9 percent of total trade). Table 1 indicates that trade 
with the SAARC countries remains substantially low over the last decade. More 
importantly, major trading partner in the SAARC region are Bangladesh and India.  
 
Table 1 
 Regional Trade Comparison (Share in Total Trade [Imports + Exports]) 
Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
NAFTA 16.0 16.9 14.6 14.8 14.2 10.5 11.7 10.4 9.6 8.6 8.6 
Europe 24.6 24.2 24.9 23.4 21.8 20.7 21.6 17.8 17.3 16.1 17.7 
Middle East 25.9 24.6 24.4 26.6 27.1 31.5 28.4 29.5 30.4 32.3 30.5 
SAARC 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.9 4.8 4.5 5.0 
Bangladesh 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.1 
India 1.2 2.0 2.2 3.1 3.1 3.3 2.7 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.3 
Sri Lanka 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Source: UN (2015). 
 
Pakistan’s trade with India ranges between 2 to 3 percent of the total trade. There 
is no substantial increase in trade between Pakistan and India even after SAFTA 
arrangement. Pakistan, the sixth most populous country, and India the second most 
populous are the two largest economies in South Asia. However, trade volume between 
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the two countries remains very low, even with a huge potential. Figure 1 shows that 
bilateral trade, despite various trade agreements, remains low. Imports from India range 
from 3.7 percent in 2006 to 4.3 percent in 2013 of the total imports. On the other hand, 
exports range from 1.9 percent to 1.6 percent of the total exports during the same period.  
 
Fig. 1.  Pakistan’s Trade with India as Percent of Total Trade 
 
Source: UN (2015). 
 
The composition of imports from India to Pakistan has been primarily limited to 
only 15 commodities, which accounted for around 90 percent of the total imports from 
India to Pakistan in 2013. The composition of exports from Pakistan to India has been 
limited to a few products. Top 15 commodities constitute 93 percent of the total exports 
to India [UN (2015)].  
Why do both countries fail to reap possible trade benefits? Various factors held 
responsible including tariff regime, trade facilitation measures, non-tariff barriers, and 
institutional, and political bottlenecks. It is evident that the closed trade regime restricts 
trade between the two economies. Pakistan and India have ranked among the most 
restrictive trade regime countries. TTRI shows that the average tariff rates are higher in 
Pakistan and India as compared to other regions such as NAFTA, EU, and OECD [Looi 
Kee, et al. (2012)].  
 
Fig. 2. TTRI—All Good (Average 2006-09) 
 
Source: Looi Kee, et al. (2012). 
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Despite some decline in tariff for various commodity groups, non-tariff barriers 
significantly hamper trade between the two countries. These measures include physical 
infrastructure, technology, procedural requirements and institutional framework. Non-
tariff measures or trade facilitation measures act as binding constraints in promoting 
trade. Trade facilitation measures are very stringent and poorly managed in both 
countries in contrast to other regions in the world. Statistics at the disaggregate level 
depict that Pakistan shows poor logistic performance on competence and quality of 
logistic services, such as transport operators and custom brokers (ranked 75), ability to 
track and trace consignments (ranked 86), and timeliness of shipments in reaching 
destination within the scheduled or expected delivery time (ranked 123) in 2014. India is 
ranked 54 among 166 countries in the LPI of 2014. Disaggregated analysis reveals that 
border agencies of India show poor logistic performance on efficiency of the clearance 
process, including custom such as speed, simplicity, and predictability of formalities 
(ranked 65), and quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (ranked 58) [Arvis, et 
al. (2014)]. 
 
Table 2 
 LPI 2014 (Ranking) 
Countries LPI Custom Infrastructure 
International 
Shipments 
Logistics 
Quality and 
Competence 
Tracking 
and Tracing Timeliness 
Germany 1 2 1 4 3 1 4 
UK 4 5 6 12 5 5 7 
Singapore 5 3 2 6 8 11 9 
USA 9 16 5 26 7 2 14 
Malaysia 25 27 26 10 32 23 31 
China 28 38 23 22 35 29 36 
Thailand 35 36 30 39 38 33 29 
Indonesia 53 55 56 74 41 58 50 
India 54 65 58 44 52 57 51 
Pakistan 72 58 69 56 75 86 123 
Maldives 82 49 82 72 74 92 148 
Sri Lanka 89 84 126 115 66 85 85 
Bangladesh 108 138 138 80 93 122 75 
Source: Arvis, et al. (2014). 
 
There is no significant improvement in the LPI over the last eight years for  
Pakistan and India. Figure 3 shows the trend of logistic performance score over the 
period i.e. 2007–2014 for Pakistan and India. Pakistan’s LPI score ranges from 2.6 in 
2007 to 2.8 in 2014. Similarly, India’s score remains stagnant at 3.1 over the last eight 
years. In crux, bilateral trade is constrained due to poor conditions of soft and physical 
infrastructure.  
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Fig. 3.  Trend in LPI 2007–2014 (Score)  
 
Source: Arvis, et al. (2014). 
 
Table 3 provides a comparison of the procedural requirements of Pakistan and 
India with other regions in the world. The table also shows that the procedural 
requirements are very high in both Pakistan and India, as compared to other regions. For 
example, nine documents are required to complete the export process and eight are 
needed for imports in Pakistan. While, only four documents are required for import or 
exports in the OECD, NAFTA and EU regions. Similar situation exists for India. On the 
other hand, 22 days are required to complete export process in Pakistan, while the same 
process is completed in 10 days in the EU and OECD countries. 
 
Table 3 
 Documents/Days Required to Complete Imports/Exports Process  
Indicators Pakistan India EAP OECD NAFTA EU World 
No. of documents for export  9 8 7 4 4 4 7 
Days for export  22 17 25 10 9 10 24 
Cost to export (US$ per container)  611 945 969 1089 1377 1032 1386 
No. of documents for import  8 9 7 5 5 4 7 
Days for import  18 20 27 11 11 10 27 
Cost to import (US$ per container)  680 960 1020 1145 1675 1095 1602 
Source: WB (2015). 
 
This section clearly indicates that various institutional and non-institutional factors 
restrict bilateral trade between India and Pakistan. High tariff rates coupled with low 
quality of trade facilitation measures significantly hamper the bilateral trade. Low quality 
of trade facilitation measures, poor physical infrastructure, and weak institutional 
framework held responsible for low trade between the two countries. Improvement in the 
physical as well as soft infrastructure is required for better trade ties between India and 
Pakistan. Any trade agreements between the two countries, including MFN that 
substantially reduce the tariff and non-tariff barriers can substantially increase the volume 
of trade. In the next section, the methodological framework is developed to empirically 
quantify the impact of these measures on trade.  
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3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides an overview of the existing literature on implications of free 
trade agreements with special focus on SAFTA and MFN. Various attempts have been 
made to quantify welfare gains and trade creations under these arrangements. Initial 
studies by Govindan (1994) and Pigato (1997) highlight that intra-regional trade can 
benefit more to small countries than India in the region. Qamar (2005) further extends 
this by saying that Pakistan not only can get benefit by accessing a big market for its 
exports, but also can save significantly, while substituting its expensive imports from the 
rest of the world to imports from India under the MFN status. Shaikh and Rahpoto (2009) 
show that under the SAFTA arrangement, Pakistan can enjoy consumer surplus in 
exports of the products like food items, cotton made garments, dates and leather. Using 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Shaikh, Syed, Shah, and Shah (2012) also 
found similar results. Raihan (2012) too found a positive welfare gain under the MFN 
status given to India, and this gain multiplied under the scenario of SAFTA. Additionally, 
it also affects the overall volume of regional and bilateral trade between India and 
Pakistan, but the increase in imports from India is greater than the volume of exports 
from Pakistan [Raihan and De (2013)]. Nabi and Nasim (2001) argued that trading 
volume will increase threefold, if both  countries give the MFN status to each other.  
Despite these predictions, why is the actual trade very low?
1
 Literature shows that 
bilateral trade is affected adversely due to non-tariff barriers. Bouët (2008) and Bouët, 
Mevel, and Thomas (2010) have shown that SAFTA members will experience a gain 
with the inclusion of sensitive products, and their exemption will limit the trade gain for 
the middle income countries. Taneja and Kalita (2011) exhibit that even after trade 
liberalisation, Pakistan does not enjoy any competitive advantage, as most of the 
commodities in export baskets are included in the sensitive list, and the government of 
India has prohibited these under the SAFTA regime. Based on Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) index, this study shows that Indian economy does not face any threat   
from Pakistan’s imports. Gopalan, Malik, and Reinert (2013) have analysed the effect of 
imports of sensitive items on output, consumer surplus, revenue generated from tariff, 
and net welfare under an imperfect substitute framework between Pakistan and India. 
Using General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), this study estimates a welfare gain 
of few millions $US on each sector, but the impact of reduced output due to increased 
imports from India will negatively affect the domestic industries of Pakistan. This 
concludes that imports from India would specifically affect the output of cloth sector, the 
footwear sector, leather, pharmaceuticals and tobacco on a large scale.
2
  
Some studies have also found that trade under the SAFTA/MFN are not attractive 
in the region. Baysan, Panagariya, and Pitigala (2006) identify that the trade under the 
SAFTA agreement is unattractive, as the countries member of SAFTA are relatively 
small as compared to the world economies. Further, the high levels of restriction among 
the SAFTA members would result in trade diversion and countries which would be worst 
off, as the member countries, currently trading outside the SAFTA region earn more. 
Even after providing the MFN status to India, welfare gain will be negative. It is due to 
the items on the Indian’s imports negative list, as 90  percent of these items belong to 
 
1See Section 2 for more detail on trading trend between Pakistan and India. 
2Various other studies have also found similar results [Nabi and Nasim (2001); Taneja (2007)].  
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manufacturing sector [Raihan and De (2013)]. De, et al. (2013) also conclude that the 
welfare gains due to the MFN are small, and extended economic cooperation between 
both countries is needed to receive maximum benefits. In short, the MFN scenario 
includes the imports at reduced prices, and serves as a source of cheap imports from India 
in addition to the assumed peace in the region.  
Despite the fact that the world welfare is increasing continuously due to 
bilateral trade, transfer of technology, and improved production, the distribution of 
these welfare gains is asymmetric. However, the revenue gain from tariff may turn 
into a loss due to the SAFTA agreement that requires free trade regime. It shows the 
cost efficient exporter benefits more than the less cost efficient exporter , and 
ultimately the less efficient importer stand to lose in the end. Additionally, the reason 
behind less increase in the exports to India is the unavailability of diversified items 
available for exports within the Pakistani exports basket. Despite the indications of 
potential gains from bilateral trade, India-Pakistan economies face constrain due to a 
continuous political rivalry between them. Thus, Pakistan and India can gain from 
SAFTA, if  their bilateral political differences are solved, and that would help to 
achieve integration in the market for the rest of the  members too. [Kugelman 
(2013)]. Further, improving the economic reforms of the county and placing them in 
line with the conditions of SAFTA, Pakistan can gain from the trade liberalisation 
[Naqvi and Schuler (2007)]. This overview indicates that there is a possibility of 
―trade creation‖ under the SAFTA/MFN, especially for those items that are not 
imported due to high customer duty, or are imported illegally. This study, thus, 
enhances the understating by focusing on the institutional and non-institutional 
arrangements. 
 
4. MODELING FRAMEWORK, DATA AND  
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Modeling Framework 
The gravity model is a widely used tool to estimate the bilateral flows between 
member countries. It relates the bilateral trade flows to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), distance, border and other socio-political factors that affect the trade patterns. The 
standard gravity model suggests that trade among member countries is positively related 
to the national income and negatively related to the distance—a proxy for transportation 
and information costs. Tinbergen (1962) in his first empirical attempt made international 
trade flow, a function of the trading countries gross national products, and three potential 
resistance variables; distance between the trading partners, a dummy variable for adjacent 
countries, and dummy variable for common membership in a preferential trade agreement 
(these all are proxies for transportation cost).These are used to reflect the hypothesis that 
transportation cost increases with distance, which are lower for the adjacent countries and 
higher for the landlocked countries/islands. A number of controls are included in the 
gravity model such as country size, common border, common language, and 
infrastructure etc.
3
 The proposed study also incorporates democratic institutions to 
 
3Theoretical foundations for the gravity model are provided by Bergstrand (1990), Frankel (1999),  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).  
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quantify the impact of institutional arrangement in boosting trade. The following basic 
gravity model is used to measure the impact of transport costs on trade:  
ijtjtitijijt eYYDX  3210)ln( … … … … (1) 
Where      denotes the value of real bilateral trade between   and   at time  ,      is 
distance between   and  ,   is the real GDP of a country.  While following Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) authors augment this model to incorporate the impact of multilateral 
resistance
4
, and other institutional variables on the trade. Given the data limitations and 
objectives of the study,  following variables in gravity model were used. 
NTBTBPCYPCYYYDX jtitjtitijijt 6543210 )(   
CBDEMOCMFNDEMOCSAFTAMFNSAFTA 110987 **   
ijteLLbCLbCBb  321  … … … … … … (2) 
Where Xijt = Total bilateral trade of Pakistan; Yit = GDP of Pakistan; Yjt = GDP of each 
partner country; PCYit – PCYjt = the difference between per capita income of Pakistan and 
each respective partner country; TB = Tariff barrier;  NTB = Non-tariff barrier; SAFTA = 
Dummy for SAFTA; MFN = Dummy for MFN; DEMOC = Democratic Institutions; CB = 
Dummy for common boarder; CL = Dummy for common language and LL = Dummy for 
landlocked.  
 
4.2. Data and Estimation Strategy 
To measure the impact of institutional and non-institutional arrangements on 
bilateral trade, a panel of eight South Asian countries was used over a period of thirty 
eight years,  1975–2013.5 The panel data estimation method is considered an efficient 
tool for analysis, as it allows inclusion of data for different cross sections, increased 
sample size that leads to better estimates, controlling for variables that are not directly 
observable, and accounts for individual heterogeneity [Iqbal and Daly (2014); Nawaz 
(2015); Nawaz, Iqbal, and Khan (2015)].  The choice of eight countries in South Asian 
region is mainly based on the availability of data. The data on bilateral trade in US$ is 
taken from Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) by International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and COMTRADE by the United Nation (UN). The econometric problem arising from 
zero trade is catered by replacing with one.  
The size of the country is measured by its respective  GDP. According to the 
gravity model, the amount of trade is positively associated with the GDPs of both 
importing and exporting countries. Increasing GDP in exporting country implies greater 
availability of products for exports, while increasing GDP in importing country implies 
higher demand for imports. Thus, the coefficients of both importing and exporting 
countries’ GDPs are expected to be positive [Gul and Yasin (2011); Kien (2009); 
Narayan and Nguyen (2016); Saini (2012)]. The expected sign of the coefficient in the 
 
4Multilateral trade resistances are the unobserved barriers to trade that each country faces with all its 
trading partners. 
5The countries include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka. 
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GDP per capita is positive according to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) hypothesis implying 
the greater this difference, the greater the relative importance of inter industry trade will 
be [Caporale, Sova, and Sova (2015)]. The data on the GDP in US$ is drawn from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI)—published by the World Bank. 
The second important factor affecting trade flows is transportation and information 
costs, measured distance between the trading partners, common borders, and whether the 
country(s) is(are) landlocked or not [Gul and Yasin (2011)]. The distance is measured as 
the air distance between Islamabad and the capital territory of each selected country. For 
distance, data is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2011). Geographical distance, a proxy 
for transportation cost, has a negative impact on bilateral trade [Caporale, et al. (2015)]. 
For common borders, a dummy variable have been used with a value of one for India, 
Afghanistan, and zero for the other South Asian countries. In this study, there are three 
landlocked countries including, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal. 
As mentioned earlier, trade is mostly affected by the institutional and non-
institutional arrangements of trading countries apart from tariffs and quotas. To measure the 
institutional quality, the important variables in extended gravity model, data is taken from 
the Polity IV dataset, published by Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2014), which is  a widely 
accepted set to measure the world democratic institutions [Yu (2010)]. This dataset 
measures institutionalised democracy, and index ranges from +0 (no democracy) to 10 (full 
democracy). In this study, it is argued that the democratic institutions may have direct as 
well as indirect impact. Following existing literature, it is hypothesized that democratic 
institutions may have a direct positive impact on bilateral trade [Yu (2010)]. Well defined 
and enforced democratic institutions can promote trade by ensuring the implementation of 
free trade agreements like SAFTA and MFN. To quantify the impact of non-institutional 
arrangements, two measures including tariff cost and non-tariff cost are used. Arvis, Duval, 
Shepherd, and Utoktham (2013) defined bilateral trade cost as: 
Trade costs in its wider sense, including not only international transport costs and tariffs 
but also other trade cost components, such as direct and indirect costs associated with 
differences in languages, currencies as well as cumbersome import or export procedures.  
Trade cost is measured using the following formula:  
;11
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Where:ij denotes geometric average trade costs between country i and country j; tij 
denotes international trade costs from country i and country j; tji denotes international 
trade costs from country j and country i; tii denotes international trade costs for country i; 
tjj denotes international trade costs for country j; xij denotes international trade flows from 
country i and country j; xji denotes international trade flows from country j and country i; 
xii denotes; international trade of country i; xjj denotes international trade of country j and 
k denotes sector specific elasticity of substitution between goods in the sector. This 
bilateral trade cost is a measure of costs associated with both importing and exporting 
goods between two countries i and j. Value of ij can be used a trade cost indicator. The 
value of tij is provided in ad valorem equivalent form. Since trade cost is bi-directional in 
nature, the bilateral trade costs indicators is also bi-directional, and is a measure 
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(geometric average) of the tariff imposed by the two partners countries on each other’s 
imports. The bilateral tariff cost indicators is defined as follows:  
jiij tarifftarifftariffavggeometric  1)(1(__ . … … … (4) 
Where geometric_avg_tariff denotes geometric average of tariffij (simple average 
effective import tariff imposed by country i on country j) and tariffji (simple average 
effective import tariff imposed by country j on country i).  
Non-tariff trade costs are also measured by excluding tariff from the total trade costs 
defined above. The non-tariff trade costs encompasses all additional costs other than tariff cost 
involved in trading goods bilaterally rather than domestically, are also calculated as:  
100
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Data is obtained from the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) World Bank: International Trade Costs published by  the World Bank 
[WB and ESCAP (2016)].  
To estimate the model, fixed effects model is used with time and cross section 
fixed effects to estimate the models. The fixed effects model is the most common 
technique for estimation of linear panel regression. In this method, the constant term 
remains as cross section specific and varies for each country, but still it is assumed that 
the slope coefficients are constant across countries. This takes into account the 
individuality of each cross-sectional unit [Nawaz (2015); Nawaz, et al. (2015); Nawaz 
and Khawaja (2016)]. Time invariant heterogeneity across members of the panel is 
eliminated by employing fixed effects [Islam (1995)]. The time effect is important 
because various factors such as technological changes, changes in government regulatory 
and/or tax policies, and external effects such as war, change over time. This approach 
captures the role of unobserved multilateral resistance [Shepherd (2013)]. Following 
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)  the PMG estimator is employed for estimating short-run 
and long-run relationships in dynamic heterogeneous panels. 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Basic Gravity Model 
The standard gravity model is estimated in terms of the GDP of  respective 
countries,  trade costs as measured by distance, and incidence of common border and 
landlocked status. The results of basic gravity model for total trade are presented in Table 
4. The basic model has been estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and the 
fixed effect with time and country specific fixed effects models.  Various specifications 
are used to ensure the robustness of results. 
The results show that for most of the estimation the coefficient of Pakistan’s GDP 
is positive and significant. This indicates that domestic development plays a significant 
role in expanding trade  volume in the country.  Estimates reveal that Pakistan’s bilateral  
70 Iqbal and Nawaz 
Table 4 
 The Basic Gravity Model 
Variables 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
LN(GDPI) 0.780 0.592 1.003 0.933 
 (0.20)*** (0.39) (0.23)*** (0.27)*** 
LN(GDPJ) 0.279 0.250 –0.076 –0.165 
 (0.11)** (0.12)** (0.26) (0.25) 
D(GDPPC) 0.000 0.001 –0.000 –0.000 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00) 
LN(Dist) –2.792 –2.579 –2.589 –2.754 
 (0.85)*** (0.92)*** (0.37)*** (0.35)*** 
CB –2.011 –1.812   
 (0.84)** (0.94)*   
LL –3.743 –3.838   
 (0.64)*** (0.68)***   
Constant 13.758 17.951 11.775 16.478 
 (7.01)* (11.70) (3.36)*** (6.76)** 
R-squared 0.679 0.702 0.920 0.931 
No of Countries 8 8 8 8 
No of Obs. 234 234 234 234 
Year FE NO YES No YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
trade with  South Asian countries will increase by 0.78 percent, as the domestic GDP 
increases by 1 percent (Table 4; model 1). The results further show that for most of the 
estimations, the coefficient of our trading partners GDPs is positive and significant, 
implying that development of partner country in the region is important for trade 
expansion. One percent increase in the GDP of partner countries will increase 0.28 
percent of Pakistan’s bilateral trade. Earlier studies support these findings for Pakistan 
[Gul and Yasin (2011)]. The coefficient of the distance variable implies that when 
distance—as a proxy for transportation cost—between Pakistan and its trading partner 
increases by 1 percent on average, bilateral trade decreases by 2.7 percent. Therefore, 
findings of the basic gravity model are consistent with the theory implying that Pakistan’s 
trade is directly related to the economic size of the partner countries, and inversely 
related to the distance between them. The study used per capita income difference 
variable in the model to test for the relative strength of the Linder hypothesis vis-à-vis the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) hypothesis. The impact of per capita income difference is positive 
and significant in the most cases. The estimated coefficient is 0.001, which implies that 
bilateral trade increase as the difference between the per capita GDP of Pakistan, and its 
trading partner increases, but less than proportionately. Thus, the available results support 
the HO hypothesis (differences in factor endowments) in the case of Pakistan. Earlier Gul 
and Yasin (2011) found similar results for Pakistan. Further, the results show that the 
common border dummy has a negative and significant impact on Pakistan’s bilateral 
trade in the region. As the model is specified in the log form, the coefficient was 
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interpreted by taking the exponential. The projected results [exp (–2.011)–1 = – 0.87] 
imply that Pakistan’s trade with its neighbouring countries (those that share a common 
border) is 87 percent lower than expected. Apparently, the result seems contradictory to 
the theory. However, the reasons are understandable: only two countries, India and 
Afghanistan have a common border with Pakistan (included in the sample). Trade with 
these countries and India in particular, is restricted due to non-tariff barriers including 
political conflicts, institutional hurdles, and procedural requirements. Further, much of 
the border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and India is 
underground and unrecorded. Gul and Yasin (2011) also found similar results. The 
dummy for landlock is statistically significant and has the expected negative sign. The 
coefficient value –0.98 [exp (–3.743)–1 = –0.98] indicates that trade between Pakistan 
and landlocked countries will be lowered by 98 percent. 
 
5.2. Role of SAFTA and MFN 
To quantify the impact of trade agreement between Pakistan and its trading 
partners, the basic gravity model was augmented by incorporating two variables for trade 
agreements i.e. SAFTA and MFN. The results of augmented gravity models are presented 
in Table 5. The results for basic variables remain similar in most of the cases reported in 
Table 4. The estimation results show that the SAFTA and MFN variable have an 
insignificant impact on Pakistan’s bilateral trade. This indicates that the regional or even 
bilateral trade agreements are not conducive for enhancing Pakistan’s bilateral trade. 
Pakistan fails to fully harvest the benefits of regional and/or bilateral integration.  
 
Table 5 
 The Augmented Gravity Model: The Role of SAFTA and MFN 
Variables 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
FE 
LN(GDPI) 0.576 0.677 1.058 1.152 1.003 
 (0.24)** (0.44) (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.23)*** 
LN(GDPJ) 0.268 0.250 –0.061 –0.165 –0.076 
 (0.11)** (0.12)** (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) 
D(GDPPC) 0.001 0.001 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LN(Dist) –2.704 –2.579 –2.595 –2.754 –2.589 
 (0.85)*** (0.92)*** (0.37)*** (0.35)*** (0.37)*** 
CB –1.909 –1.812    
 (0.85)** (0.94)*    
LL –3.744 –3.838    
 (0.64)*** (0.68)***    
SAFTA 0.548 –0.255 –0.175 –0.172  
 (0.38) (1.11) (0.19) (0.32)  
MFN     1.375 
     (1.31) 
Constant 18.277 15.992 10.189 11.428 11.775 
 (7.27)** (12.24) (3.42)*** (7.19) (3.36)*** 
R-squared 0.682 0.702 0.921 0.931 0.920 
No of Countries 8 8 8 8 8 
No of Obs. 234 234 234 234 234 
Year FE NO YES No YES No 
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Now question arises: why does Pakistan fail to achieve the benefits of trade 
agreement in the region? Are SAFTA and/or MFN relevant? To answer these questions, 
analysis was extended to find the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of SAFTA and/or 
MFN in promoting Pakistan’s bilateral trade. There are three possible reasons, apart from 
others, for malfunctioning of SAFTA and/or MFN. These include: 
(i) Role of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers. 
(ii) Role of Institutional Framework. 
(iii) Short run vs. long run impacts. 
 
5.2.1.  Role of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
It is generally believed that tariff and non-tariff barriers act as a binding constraint 
in promoting bilateral and/or regional trade. To quantify the impact of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, the basic gravity model was augmented. The results are presented in the 
Table 6 below. It was found that tariff has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on Pakistan’s bilateral trade. The estimated coefficient is –11.660 which is statistically 
 
Table 6 
The Augmented Gravity Model: The Role of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
Variables 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
LN(GDPI) –0.203  0.516  
 (0.30)  (0.56)  
LN(GDPJ) 0.580 0.557 –0.054 1.604 
 (0.30)* (0.26)** (0.57) (1.18) 
D(GDPPC) –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(Dist) –3.258 –3.765 –0.795 –1.837 
 (0.97)*** (1.04)*** (0.21)*** (0.65)** 
CB –3.682 –4.178   
 (0.74)*** (0.81)***   
LL –0.975 –1.109   
 (1.56) (1.46)   
LN(Tariff) –11.660 –10.995 –11.270 –11.093 
 (2.75)*** (3.07)*** (2.61)*** (3.10)*** 
LN(Non-Tariff) –4.141 –4.107 –4.387 –3.880 
 (0.66)*** (0.55)*** (0.60)*** (0.61)*** 
Constant 56.372 55.185 34.460 12.925 
 (11.82)*** (11.80)*** (6.70)*** (25.02) 
R-squared 0.992 0.994 0.992 0.994 
No. of Countries 8 8 8 8 
No. of Obs. 36 36 36 36 
Year FE NO YES No YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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significant at 1 percent. The coefficient of the tariff variable implies that when tariff 
increases by 1 percent, Pakistan’s bilateral trade decreases by 11.7 percent. Similarly,  
non-tariff has also a negative and statistically significant effect on Pakistan’s bilateral 
trade. The estimated coefficient is –4.141 which is statistically significant at 1 percent. 
The coefficient of the non-tariff variable implies that when non-tariff increases by 1 
percent, Pakistan’s bilateral trade decreases by 4.1 percent. These findings indicate that a 
reduction in the tariff and non-tariff barriers can enhance the bilateral trade. Hence, the 
regional and/or bilateral trade agreements are helpful in promoting trade among regional 
countries. But, region as a whole fails to reduce tariff rate and eliminate non-tariff 
barriers as reported in Section 2. Only signing an agreement has no impact on trade. 
Concrete measures are required to boost trade. Why Pakistan and other regional countries 
fail to remove non-tariff barriers? The possible answer of this question is that institutional 
framework is not good enough to control non-tariff barriers. For example, documentation 
process is time consuming along with the existence of bribery and high underground 
trades are some of the notable reasons of non-tariff barriers. 
 
5.2.2.  Role of Institutional Framework 
To quantify the impact of institutional framework in making trade agreement 
effective, interactive term of SAFTA and democratic institutions and MFN and 
democratic institutions were used. The results are presented in Table 7. The results show 
that interactive terms of  SAFTA and  democratic  institutions  have  a positive impact on  
 
Table 7 
 The Augmented Gravity Model: The Role of Democratic Institutions 
Variables 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
LN(GDPI) 1.532 1.444 1.200 1.393 
 (0.19)*** (0.41)*** (0.30)*** (0.35)*** 
LN(GDPJ) –0.901 –0.847 –0.491 –0.947 
 (0.12)*** (0.14)*** (0.35) (0.38)** 
D(GDPPC) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00) 
LN(Dist) –4.338 –3.720 –4.868 –5.687 
 (0.72)*** (0.79)*** (0.71)*** (0.76)*** 
CB –1.740 –1.177   
 (0.81)** (0.88)   
LL –8.381 –8.030   
 (0.57)*** (0.66)***   
SAFTA*DEMOC 0.081 0.086   
 (0.04)** (0.04)**   
MFN*DEMOC   1.454 1.595 
   (0.21)*** (0.20)*** 
Constant 35.859 32.687 29.567 40.258 
 (6.64)*** (11.31)*** (5.09)*** (7.54)*** 
R-squared 0.768 0.785 0.936 0.947 
No of Countries 8 8 8 8 
No of Obs.  200 200 200 200 
Year FE NO YES No YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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bilateral trade. The estimated coefficient is 0.081 which is statistically significant at 5 
percent. The results further show that interactive term of the MFN and democratic 
institutions have a positive impact on bilateral trade. The estimated coefficient is 1.4 
which is statistically significant at 1 percent. These findings highlight the role of 
democratic institutions in promoting trade. Regional and/or bilateral trade agreements 
have a significant role, only when these agreements are supported by a well-developed 
and enforced institutional framework. What well developed and enforced institutional 
framework ensure? The well-defined institutional framework ensures the implementation 
of agreements. For example, the reduction of tariff rate and removal of non-tariff barriers 
can only be achieved, if institutional frameworks are well developed and enforced.  
 
5.2.3.  Long Run vs. Short Run Impacts 
The third possibility of insignificant impact of SAFTA and/or MFN might be due to 
differences in the impact of these agreements in the short and the long run. It is difficult to 
fully harvest the benefits of regional and/or bilateral integration in the short run. The impact 
of SAFAT on bilateral trade for short run as well for long run was measured. The results are 
presented in the Table 8 below. The results based on PMG estimation show that variable 
representing regional integration is not significant in the short run. The estimated coefficient 
of SAFTA has an insignificant impact on bilateral trade in the short run. On the other hand, 
the estimation results show that the variable representing regional integration is significant 
in the long run. The estimated coefficient of SAFTA has a significant impact on bilateral 
trade in the long run. This implies that in the short run, the regional integration may not be 
effective. It is because, regional and/or bilateral is a long term concept. Various institutional 
reforms are required to reap the potential benefits of regional and/or bilateral integration. 
However, in the short run, it is difficult to remove non-tariff barriers. 
 
Table 8 
The Augmented Gravity Model: ARDL Estimates Based on PMG 
Variables 
(1) 
Ecm 
(2) 
SR 
Short run Coefficient 
Ecm  –0.566 
  (0.14)*** 
D.LN(GDPI)  1.482 
  (0.33)*** 
D.LN(GDPJ)  4.113 
  (1.05)*** 
D.SAFTA  –0.076 
  (0.12) 
Constant  3.816 
  (5.39) 
Long run Coefficient 
LN(GDPI) –0.325  
 (0.28)  
LN(GDPJ) –6.577  
 (1.06)***  
SAFTA 0.302  
 (0.14)**  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has investigated the impact of institutional and non-institutional 
arrangements on bilateral trade, using extended gravity model which incorporates the role 
of democratic institutions and non-tariff barriers. This paper also investigated the impact 
of SAFTA on bilateral trade in the short as well as in the long run. The empirical 
analysis, based on a panel of eight South Asian countries comprising data over 1975–
2013. For empirical analysis, fixed effects model was employed with time and cross 
section fixed to estimate  models. The PMG estimator was also employed for estimating 
the short run and the long-run relationships in a dynamic heterogeneous panels.  
The empirical analysis has shown that regional and/or bilateral agreements are not 
effective in promoting bilateral trade between Pakistan and its regional trading partners. 
The impact of SAFTA and MFN on bilateral trade is insignificant. Further empirical 
analysis has shown that SAFTA and MFN become effective and contribute to bilateral 
trade significantly, if complemented by a well-developed and enforced democratic 
institutional framework. This implies that a strong political will is required to channel the 
impact of SAFTA and MFN on bilateral trade. Empirical analysis has also shown that 
tariff and non-tariff barriers act as a binding constraint in expanding bilateral trade in the 
region. Both tariff and non-tariff barriers have a significant negative impact on Pakistan’s 
bilateral trade in the region. Empirical analysis also depicts that  the SAFTA may not be 
effective in the short run, as it has an insignificant impact on trade in  the short run, but is 
effective in the long run, as it has a significant impact on trade in the long run. This 
finding also supports the role of institutional framework. Regional and/or bilateral trade 
agreement requires various policy reforms to reduce tariff barrier as well as removal of 
non-tariff barriers. These reforms can only be implemented if these agreements are 
supported by well-defined institutions.  
 
Policy Implications   
Based on key findings of the study, suggested policy framework is divided into 
two parts: (i) Economic Framework, and (ii) Institutional Framework.  
(i) Economic Framework: the basic gravity model reveals a positive association 
between economic growth and trade, indicating necessary role of economic 
growth for trade. The government should promote sustained and high 
economic growth by reforming the industrial sector which is a backbone of the  
economy. Economic growth has both demand as well as supply side 
implications for trade. On demand side, it creates more demand for foreign 
goods and on the supply side, it helps to produce more goods for exports. 
Sustained growth will reduce the cost of production, which ultimately, 
improves competitiveness that is required for trade. The government should 
also invest on physical infrastructure to reduce distance cost which negatively 
affects bilateral trade. Long run vs. short run analysis suggests that long run 
policy reforms are required to promote trade—as trade reform is a long term 
phenomenon, and its benefits could be measured in the long run, rather than in 
the short run. In the short run there is a possibility that some sectors may face 
loss, but in the long run there will be a win-win situation for all countries.  
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(ii) Institutional Framework: given the weak institutional framework of the 
regional economies, the regional and/or bilateral agreements may not yield 
effective strategy to promote bilateral trade. The regional and/or bilateral 
agreements can only be effective, when these are supported by a well-defined 
and enforced institutional framework. Analysis has shown that democratic 
institutions play significant role in realising the benefits of the regional and/or 
bilateral agreements. This implies that the outcome of these trade reforms 
crucially depends upon the institutional framework of the country. Institutional 
arrangements are a pre-requisite for achieving the fruits of the MFN and 
SAFTA. Trade cost is the most binding constraint. To improve the trade ties 
between trading countries, like Pakistan and India, requires extensive reform  
in reducing trade cost. Trade facilitation measures need to be improved and 
tariff rates should be reduced for boosting trade, and making free trade 
agreement effective. In summation, to improve the trade ties between the two 
countries, improvement in physical as well as soft infrastructure is required. 
Any trade agreements between the two countries, including the MFN can only 
be effective in expanding bilateral trade, when it is supported by a well-
defined and enforced institutional framework that ensure the implementation 
of policy reforms needed to reduce tariff rates and remove non-tariff barriers.  
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